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Abstrat
This paper studies dynami prie ompetition over two periods between two
rms selling dierentiated durable goods to two buyers who are privately informed
about their types, but have valuations of the two goods dependent on the other
buyer's type. The rms' priing strategy in period 1 must take into aount the
buyers' inentive to wait and learn from the other buyer's deision. We onstrut
an equilibrium based on the key observation that the expeted prie of either good
in period 2 is the same as its prie in period 1 on and o the path of play. The
equilibrium is shown to be non-preemptive in the sense that even if either rm fails
to make a sale in period 1, it still makes a sale with positive probability in period
2. A haraterization of the equilibrium is given in terms of the probability of delay
as a funtion of the degree of interdependene between the two buyers.
Key words: dynami priing, delay, soial learning, duopoly, produt dierentiation,
durable good, preemption, revenue management.
Journal of Eonomi Literature Classiation Numbers: C72, D82.
1 Introdution
Consumer preferenes are intrinsially interdependent in many durable goods markets.
Consider, for example, potential onsumers of a new model of an automobile. Purhase
deisions of suh a produt are aompanied by areful examination of various informa-
tion about it: Consumers ollet information from a atalog and magazine artiles as
well as from their own experiene of produts from the same manufaturer. They then

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summarize suh information to form an opinion as an estimate of his valuation of the
produt. However, the individual piee of information is arguably imperfet, and eah
onsumer has a better estimate of his valuation when the opinions of all onsumers are
pooled.
1
When diret and truthful ommuniation of opinions is not feasible, hene, eah
onsumer has an inentive to wait and see the deisions of other onsumers to indiretly
learn their opinions.
We are interested in the problem of intertemporal prie ompetition between two
rms selling dierentiated durable goods to suh interdependent onsumers. In our
model, two onsumers eah have private opinions about the relative superiority of the
two goods, and buy a single unit of either good in one of the two periods in an irre-
versible manner. Hene, a onsumer in period 1 must deide between buying today from
either rm for the quoted prie, and waiting until tomorrow. If he waits, he has better
information about his valuation, but the prie oer by eah rm in period 2 is also on-
tingent on the buyers' deision and an be high or low depending on whether its produt
was hosen in period 1. Eah rm, on the other hand, needs to set its prie taking into
aount the onsumers' inentives to `wait and see' as well as the priing deision of the
other rm. For example, by oering a disount in period 1, a rm may preempt the
market by apturing one of the onsumers and then be able to sell the good to the other
onsumer at a higher prie in period 2. On the other hand, oering a disount may
be detrimental to the prots if, for example, it leads to a more intense ompetition in
period 2. Further, eah rm needs to take into aount the information ow generated
by its priing deision. This simple disussion already suggests the omplexity of the
strategi interation between the onsumers, between the rms, and between the rms
and the onsumers.
A more detailed desription of our model is as follows: Two rmsA and B sell durable
goods A and B, respetively, over two periods. There are two onsumers i = 1, 2 eah
of whom is endowed with the private type s
i
whih represents his opinion about the
goods as desribed above. We assume that the type s
i
has a one-dimensional ontinuous
1
A onsumer's opinion hene may be a noisy signal about the true (subjetive) value of the produt,
or may be his subjetive valuation of it. In the former interpretation, the two opinions will be positively
orrelated if they are information about the same aspet of the produt but an be independent if they are
about dierent aspets of it (e.g., driving performane and fuel eÆieny of an automobile). Valuations
an be interdependent even when the opinions are subjetive if, for example, onsumers are onerned
with how they are pereived by others. As will be seen, the present paper formulates interdependent
valuations based on independent opinions. While independene is assumed mainly for simpliity, the
same formulation is frequently used in the mehanism design literature. See for example Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001).
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distribution. We express the interdependene of their preferenes by assuming that
buyer i's valuation of either good is the weighted sum of his and the other buyer's types.
We also assume that the onsumers' preferenes are idiosynrati by supposing that the
weight plaed on the own opinion is larger than that plaed on the other onsumer's
opinion. The types are ordered so that the higher the type s
i
, the higher is buyer i's
relative valuation of good B.
2
Eah onsumer demands at most one unit of either good
and purhases the produt at most one in one of the two periods. In period 1, the rms
quote pries simultaneously, and the onsumers make simultaneous deisions on whether
to buy either good or wait until period 2. The publi history omprises the pries and
onsumer deisions in period 1. Given the updated belief about the onsumers' types,
the rms in period 2 again quote pries simultaneously, and any remaining onsumers
make purhase deisions simultaneously again based on the updated beliefs about eah
other's type.
Our analysis fouses on equilibrium in whih the buyers' period 1 behavior faing
any prie prole is sorted by their types. Speially, under any prie prole, we assume
that the type spae is divided into three intervals: the buyer types in the lowest interval
who have the most favorable opinion about good A hoose A in period 1, those in the
highest interval who have the most favorable opinion about good B hoose B in period
1, and those in the middle interval who have a moderate opinion about both goods defer
their deisions until period 2.
3
The rst key observation we make is on the intertemporal property of the pries on
and o the equilibrium path. Speially, we demonstrate that in equilibrium, the prie
path must be a martingale: for eah rm, the ex ante expeted value of its period 2
prie equals its period 1 prie both on and o the equilibrium path. This ritial result
is then extensively used in the derivation and haraterization of an equilibrium. We
rst examine if the equilibrium an have the preemptive property. In other words, we
examine if in equilibrium, any rm that suessfully attrats one buyer in period 1 also
sells to any remaining buyer in period 2. Although suh preemption appears plausible
given the strong position of the rm whih wins a buyer in period 1, we show that it is not
onsistent with an equilibrium: Preemption requires the period 1 prie to be very low,
induing either rm to protably inrease its period 1 prie although it implies giving
up the period 1 market share ompletely and onentrating on the period 2 market.
2
We assume that the probability distribution of the type is independent between the onsumers. This
dierentiates the present model from the standard models of soial learning that suppose that the types
are the noisy signals of the underlying state of the world.
3
The thresholds between the intervals depend on the period 1 pries, and one or more of the intervals
may be empty.
3
This nding leads to the onsideration of a strategy prole in whih the losing rm
(if any) in period 1 makes a sale in period 2 with positive probability. The main theo-
rem of the paper onstruts an equilibrium with this property taking advantage of the
martingale property. We observe that the equilibrium period 1 prie, whih is uniquely
determined, entails a disount ompared with that in the one-period model to reet
the inreased bargaining power of the buyers in the two-period model where they have
a delay option. This disount is shown to be inreasing in the degree of interdependene
of the preferenes. We an interpret this as the rms' response to the stronger inentive
of the more interdependent onsumers to delay their deisions. Interestingly, however,
we also obtain a ounter-intuitive onlusion that the probability of delay in equilibrium
is dereasing in the degree of interdependene. As a natural onsequene of this fat, we
also nd that the eÆieny of the buyers' deisions in this equilibrium dereases with
the degree of their interdependene.
The paper is organized as follows. After the disussion of the related literature in
the next setion, we formulate our model in Setion 3. In Setion 4, we analyze the
equilibrium in the seond period based on the sorting assumption of the buyer behavior
in period 1. Setion 5 derives the key martingale property of the prie dynamis. We
demonstrate the impossibility of the preemptive equilibrium in Setion 6. Setion 7
presents the main theorem of the paper that onstruts the equilibrium. Charateriza-
tions of this equilibrium as well as omparative statis analysis are given in Setion 8.
We onlude with a disussion in Setion 9.
2 Related Literature
Our model extends the standard models of dynami durable good markets in at least two
diretions: First, we introdue interdependene in preferenes between onsumers whih
we onsider essential for many durable goods as disussed above. Seond, we introdue
ompetition between the rms as a realisti feature of many durable goods markets.
The assumption on the interdependene of preferenes in our model implies the
presene of soial learning by the onsumers. In the soial learning literature that begins
with Banerjee (1992) and Bikhhandani et al. (1992), delay indued by learning is one
of the entral topis. Among others, Chamley and Gale (1994) and Gul and Lundholm
(1995) present a model of strategi delay in the ontext of dynami investment deisions.
4
More reently, the literature on soial learning looks at the sequential sales of a produt
4
See also Sgroi (2002) and Gunay (2008a, b). A textbook treatment of soial learning and delay an
be found in Chamley (2004).
4
of unertain quality by a monopolist, who optimally ontrols its prie ontingent on sales
history.
5
The standard assumption there is that eah onsumer makes a single deision:
They either take a prie oer, or else exit the market. Our model is new in that it
ombines the multiple purhase deisions and the strategi priing of a produt. Natural
as it may appear, this ombination has not been explored before to the best of our
knowledge perhaps beause of the substantial ompliations expeted in the tehnial
analysis. In partiular, there is fundamental diÆulty in heking the rms' deviation
inentives in period 1 when those deviations hange the buyers' delay inentives and also
the outlook of the period 2 market. We show that the problem is solvable with the use
of the martingale property mentioned in the Introdution.
The ability of onsumers to wait and look for a better opportunity in later periods as
examined here is the main theme of the literature on durable good monopoly that begins
with the Coase onjeture. The subjet is also extensively studied in the marketing
literature on strategi onsumers.
6
The possibility that the buyers fae unertainty in
their valuations is onsidered, among others, by Yu et al. (2011), and Bhalla (2012).
7
Yu et al. (2011) study a two-period model of monopolisti sales when onsumers learn
about their valuations in the seond period and the monopolist an ontrol the number of
produts sold in eah period. Bhalla (2012) studies a two-period model of monopolisti
sales in whih two onsumers eah observe a noisy signal about the binary produt
quality. When only onsumer 1 is ative in period 1 and may delay his deision until
period 2, Bhalla (2012) shows that equilibrium priing depends on the prior probability
of the high quality produt.
Problems in whih rms with dierentiated produts ompete in prie for onsumers
who may delay their deisions are studied by Chen and Zhang (2009), Levin et al. (2009),
and Liu and Zhang (2013). In Chen and Zhang (2009), the market onsists of two seg-
ments that are loyal to either rm, and one segment that is opportunisti. Levin et
al. (2009) also suppose that the market onsists of multiple segments and that the val-
uation of eah produt is randomly determined every period. Liu and Zhang (2013)
formulate a model of vertial produt dierentiation when onsumer valuations are ran-
dom but xed over the periods.
8
5
See, for example, Bose et al. (2006, 2008), Aoyagi (2010), and Bhalla (2013).
6
Beginning with Besanko and Winston (1990), one entral question in this literature is what happens
to the seller's revenue when the onsumers beome non-myopi and is given a hane to delay their
deisions. See Gonsh et al. (2012) for a omplete survey of the literature.
7
Gunay (2013) onsiders a model in whih the seller but not the buyers is privately informed of the
quality of its good.
8
Mak et al. (2012) onsider prie ompetition when one buyer alternates between two sellers who
5
To the best of our knowledge, however, the literature has only looked at the private
value environment where eah buyer's valuation is a funtion only of his own type or
signal. Our model hene departs from the literature with the introdution of soial
learning based on interdependent valuations.
3 Model
Two risk neutral rms A and B sell durable goods A and B, respetively, over two
periods t = 1, 2 to two buyers i = 1, 2. Eah buyer i has private type s
i
that aets
his and the other buyer's valuations of the two goods. Suppose that s
i
has a uniform
distribution over the unit interval [0; 1℄. The value of a single unit of good A to buyer i
is given by
v
i
= u+ (1  k)(1   s
i
) + k(1  s
j
) = u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
  ks
j
;
and that of good B is given by
w
i
= u+ (1  k)s
i
+ ks
j
;
where u and k are onstants satisfying 0  k <
1
2
and u >
1
2
  k.
9
When k > 0, the
two buyers' valuations of the goods are interdependent, and the larger is k, the more
dependent buyers are on the other buyer's type. Sine k < 1=2, eah buyer plaes more
weight on his own type than the other buyer's type.
10
On the other hand, when k = 0,
the valuations are independent. Note also that the value of good B inreases with both
s
i
and s
j
, whereas that of good A dereases with them. Eah buyer demands at most
one unit of either good.
The game proeeds as follows: In period 1, the two rms publily and simultaneously
quote pries p
1
A
and p
1
B
of their own goods. The two buyers then make simultaneous
deisions on whether to buy either good or not buy and wait. If a buyer hooses to
buy either good, then the deision is irreversible and he makes no further deision. The
buyers' deisions in period 1 are publily observed. If there is at least one buyer who
hooses to wait in period 1, the two rms again publily and simultaneously quote pries
p
2
A
and p
2
B
in period 2. Any buyer still in the market in period 2 then hooses to buy
either good or not buy.
supply idential produts.
9
The latter ondition ensures that the buyers' partiipation onstraint does not bind in the period 2
prie equilibrium. The multiplier (1  k) is added to keep onstant the range of valuations regardless of
the value of k.
10
The speiation of valuations follows that in Aoyagi (2010).
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Eah rm f hooses its prie p
t
f
in period t from the set R
+
of non-negative real
numbers, whereas eah buyer imakes his hoie d
t
i
in period t from the setD = fA;B; ;g,
where d
t
i
= ; represents i's deision to make no purhase in period t. Any buyer i who
hooses to buy neither good in period 1 makes another deision in period 2 so that d
1
i
= ;
an alternatively be interpreted as the deision to wait. A period 1 history h = (p
1
; d
1
)
then onsists of a pair p
1
= (p
1
A
; p
1
B
) 2 R
2
+
of the pries quoted by the two rms as well
as a pair d
1
= (d
1
1
; d
1
2
) of the deisions of the two buyers. Denote by H = R
2
+
D
2
the
set of all period 1 histories. For i = 1, 2, let
H
i
=

h = (p
1
; d
1
) 2 H : d
1
i
= ;
	
be the set of period 1 histories along whih buyer i waits, and
H
12
= H
1
[H
2
be the set of histories along whih at least one buyer waits. Firm f 's strategy onsists
of its prie 
1
f
in period 1 as well as the mapping 
2
f
: H ! R
+
that determines its
period 2 prie p
2
f
= 
2
f
(h) as a funtion of the period 1 history h 2 H. On the other
hand, buyer i's strategy is a mapping 
1
i
: S
i
 R
2
+
! D that determines his period
1 hoie as a funtion of his type s
i
and the period 1 pries p
1
, along with a mapping

2
i
: S
i
R
2
+
H ! D that determines his period 2 hoie as a funtion of his type s
i
,
the period 1 history h as well as the period 2 prie pair p
2
. Sine buyer i has a deision
to make in period 2 only if he hooses to wait in period 1, we impose the restrition that

2
i
(s
i
; p
2
; h) = ; if h =2 H
i
.
We will onsider an equilibrium of this game whih is a natural extension of perfet
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Speially, we impose an additional requirement that
beliefs be obtained through Bayes rule from the buyers' strategies even when the period 1
prie pair is o the path of play.
11
The remainder of this setion introdues some notation
for the payos to present a formal desription of the equilibrium. The uninterested reader
an skip to the next setion.
For any pair p = (p
A
; p
B
) of pries and pair s = (s
1
; s
2
) of types, let 
i
(s; p; d
i
)
denote buyer i's ex post payo from deision d
i
2 D:

i
(s; p; d
i
) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
v
i
  p
A
if d
i
= A,
w
i
  p
B
if d
i
= B,
0 if d
i
= ;.
11
Note that in the standard PBE, the belief is obtained through Bayes rule only along the equilibrium
path. Our requirement would be implied by onsisteny in the denition of a sequential equilibrium
whih is dened for nite games.
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When the strategies of the rms and the buyers in period 2 are given, buyer i's ex post
payo over two periods as a funtion of his type as well as history h = (p
1
; d
1
) is then
written as:

i
(s; p
1
; d
1
j 
2
; 
2
) =
8
<
:

i
(s; p
1
; d
1
i
) if d
1
i
= A or B,

i
 
s; 
2
(h); 
2
i
(s
i
; 
2
(h); h)

if d
1
i
= ;,
where h = (p
1
; d
1
). Now for any history h 2 H, let
P
i
( j h)
denote the onditional distribution of buyer i's type s
i
given h. Eah rm f 's period 2
payo from buyer i is expressed as a funtion of the period 2 prie pair p
2
as well as
when history h and buyer i's period 2 strategies 
2
i
:

2
f;i
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h) = p
2
f
P
i
 

2
i
(s
i
; p
2
; h) = f j h

Furthermore, when the two buyers' strategies  = (
1
; 
2
) in both periods as well as the
rms' strategies 
2
= (
2
A
; 
2
B
) in period 2 are given, let 
f;i
(p
1
j ; 
2
) denote rm f 's
payo over two periods from buyer i as a funtion of the period 1 prie pair:

f;i
(p
1
j 
i
; 
2
) = p
1
f
P
 

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = f

+E


2
f;i
(
2
(h) j 
2
; h)

;
where h = (p
1
; 
1
1
(s
1
; p
1
); 
1
2
(s
2
; p
1
)). Firm f 's per buyer payos from both buyers in
period 2 and over two periods are then given by

2
f
(p
2
j 
2
; h) =
1
2
2
X
i=1

2
f;i
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h); and 
f
(p
1
j ; 
2
) =
1
2
2
X
i=1

f;i
(p
1
j ; 
2
);
respetively.
In period 2, for any type s
i
, history h 2 H
i
, and period 2 prie pair p
2
, buyer i's
deision 
2
i
(s
i
; p
2
; h) 2 D in period 2 maximizes his expeted utility, and for any h 2 H
12
along whih at least one buyer hooses to wait in period 1, the rms' prie pair 
2
(h)
in period 2 is a NE of the rms' game in period 2 given the belief P
i
( j h) about eah
buyer i's type onditional on h. Formally, for eah i = 1, 2, h 2 H
i
and p
2
2 R
2
+
, 
2
i
is
sequentially rational and satises

2
i
(s
i
; p
2
; h) 2 argmax
d
2
i
E
s
j


i
(s; p
2
; d
2
i
) j s
i
; h

;
and for eah h 2 H
12
and 
2
that is sequentially rational, 
2
(h) is sequentially rational
and satises for f = A, B, and ` 6= f ,

2
f
(h) 2 argmax
p
2
f

2
f
(p
2
f
; 
2
`
(h) j 
2
; h):
8
Furthermore, faing any prie pair p
1
, buyer i's period 1 strategy 
1
i
is sequentially
rational given the sequentially rational period 2 strategies 
2
and 
2
: For every type s
i
,

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) 2 argmax
d
1
i
E


i
(s
i
; p
1
; d
1
i
j 
2
; 
2
)

;
and the prie pair 
1
is a NE of the rms' game given the buyers' strategies and the
rms' period 2 strategies both of whih are sequentially rational: For f = A, B, and
` 6= f ,

1
f
2 argmax
p
1
f

f
(p
1
f
; 
1
`
j ; 
2
):
Finally, the onditional distribution P
i
( j h) about buyer i's type s
i
given history h =
(p
1
; d
1
) 2 H is derived through Bayes rule whenever a stritly positive measure of types
of buyer i hoose d
1
i
when faed with p
1
: P
i
 

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = d
1
i

> 0. P
i
( j h) is arbitrary
otherwise.
4 Equilibrium in Period 2
We begin by solving for an equilibrium in period 2. Consider buyer i's problem in period
2 following history h 2 H
i
along whih he hooses to wait d
1
i
= ; in period 1. Let e
j
(h)
be the expeted value of buyer j's type s
j
implied by the period 1 history h:
e
j
(h) = E
s
j
[s
j
j h℄ = E
s
j
[s
j
j p
1
; d
1
j
℄; (1)
where the onditional expetation E
s
j
[ j h℄ given h is taken with respet to the on-
ditional distribution P
s
j
( j h) given h. Faing the prie pair p
2
in period 2, buyer i
hooses A in period 2 if
u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
  ke
j
(h)  p
2
A
> max

u+ (1  k)s
i
+ ke
j
(h)  p
2
B
; 0
	
;
hooses B if
u+ (1  k)s
i
+ ke
j
(h)  p
2
B
> max

u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
  ke
j
(h)  p
2
A
; 0
	
;
and hooses ; if
0 > max

u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
  ke
j
(h)  p
2
A
; u+ (1  k)s
i
+ ke
j
(h)  p
2
B
	
:
In any PBE, hene, buyer i's period 2 strategy 
2
i
along any history h 2 H
i
must satisfy

2
i
(s
i
; p
2
; h) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
A if s
i
< min
n
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
;
u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
o
,
B if s
i
> max
n
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
;
 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k
o
,
; if
u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
< s
i
<
 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k
.
(2)
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Consider next the rms' game in period 2 following h 2 H
i
along whih buyer i hooses
to wait in period 1. It follows from (2) that rm A's period 2 payo from buyer i along
h 2 H
i
is given by

2
A;i
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h) = p
2
A
P
i

s
i
< min

1  2ke
j
(h)  p
2
A
+ p
2
B
2(1  k)
;
u+ 1  ke
j
(h)   p
2
A
1  k




h

:
Likewise, rm B's period 2 payo from buyer i is given by

2
B;i
(p
2
j 
2
; h) = p
2
B
P
i

s
i
> max

1  2ke
j
(h)   p
2
A
+ p
2
B
2(1   k)
;
 u  ke
j
(h) + p
2
B
1  k




h

:
We assume throughout that the buyers' period 1 strategies are suh that for any
prie pair p
1
, there exist x(p
1
) and y(p
1
) with 0  x(p
1
)  y(p
1
)  1 suh that

i
(s
i
; p
1
) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
A if s
i
< x(p
1
),
; if x(p
1
) < s
i
< y(p
1
),
B if s
i
> y(p
1
).
(3)
In other words, when faed with p
1
, buyer i hooses A if his type is at the lower-end of
the type spae, B if it is at the higher-end, and ; if it is in the middle. For simpliity,
we often omit the dependene of the thresholds on p
1
and simply write them as x and y.
Although we assume that the buyers do not disount the period 2 payos, our justi-
ation of this sorting assumption omes from the observation that when they do, their
period 1 strategy must take this form in any equilibrium. Speially, let Æ 2 (0; 1℄
denote their disount fator and suppose that when they buy either good in period 2,
the value of the good as well as its prie is disounted by Æ. For example, when buyer i
buys A in period 1 for prie p
1
A
, his payo equals v
i
  p
1
A
, but when he buys it in period
2 for prie p
2
A
, his payo equals Æ(v
i
  p
2
A
). We have the following observation in this
ase.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (; ; P ) is an equilibrium under positive disounting Æ < 1
by the buyers. For any buyer i and period 1 prie prole p
1
, 
1
i
satises (3) for some
x = x(p
1
) and y = y(p
1
) suh that 0  x  y  1.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows: Suppose there is some type s
i
for whom
hoosing A in period 1 is optimal. Consider any type s
0
i
< s
i
. First, no suh s
0
i
will
hoose B in period 1. Seond, if s
0
i
waits and hooses A in period 2 after some move by
j in period 1, then his payo onditional on that event is stritly lower than hoosing
A in period 1 beause of positive disounting. Third, if he waits and hooses B after
10
some move by j, then his payo onditional on that event is stritly lower than the
orresponding payo of type s
i
. It follows that type s
0
i
stritly prefers hoosing A to
waiting in period 1.
(3) need not hold under no disounting sine hoosing A in period 1 may yield the
same payo as waiting and then unonditionally hoosing A in period 2 not just for a
single type but for a range of types. However, Lemma 1 shows that if we require the
buyer behavior to be ontinuous at Æ = 1, then it should satisfy (3).
When buyer j's deision is desribed by (3), then e
j
(h) dened in (1) equals:
e
j
(h) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
x
2
if d
1
j
= A,
x+y
2
if d
1
j
= ;,
1+y
2
if d
1
j
= B.
(4)
Suppose that both buyers use the same period 1 strategy (3) with x < y. Then the
onditional probability P
i
( j h) given h 2 H
i
is the uniform distribution over the interval
(x; y). Hene, rm f 's expeted payo 
2
f;i
from buyer i in period 2 an be expliitly
given as in the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix. Furthermore, given the symmetry
between the buyers' strategies, rm f 's (per buyer) payo 
2
f
from both buyers equals

2
f;i
after any history h 2 H
1
\ H
2
along whih they both wait in period 1. Based on
these payo funtions, the following lemma identies the equilibrium of the rms' game
in period 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for some p
1
, the buyers' behavior in period 1 is desribed by (3)
for x = x(p
1
) < y(p
1
) = y. Then the equilibrium prie prole
 

2
A
(h); 
2
B
(h)

in period
2 following history h = (p
1
; d
1
) 2 H
12
is unique and given as follows:
a) (interior equilibrium) If 1  2ke
j
(h) 2 [2(1  k)(2x   y); 2(1   k)(2y   x)℄,
12
then
 

2
A
(h); 
2
B
(h)

=

1  2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)(y   2x)
3
;
 1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)(2y   x)
3

;
(5)
and the two rms segment the market with rm A apturing

x;
1 2ke
j
(h)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3

and rm B apturing

1 2ke
j
(h)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3
; y

.
b) (A-orner equilibrium) If 1  2ke
j
(h) > 2(1  k)(2y   x), then
 

2
A
(h); 
2
B
(h)

= (1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1   k)y; 0) ; (6)
and rm A monopolizes the market by apturing (x; y).
12
Sine y  x, 2(1   k)(2x  y)  2(1   k)(2y   x).
11
) (B-orner equilibrium) If 1  2ke
j
(h) < 2(1  k)(2x   y), then
 

2
A
(h); 
2
B
(h)

= (0;  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)x) ; (7)
and rm B monopolizes the market by apturing (x; y).
p
2
A
p
2
B
R
1
R
2
R
3
R
4
p
2
B
= BR
B
(p
2
A
)
p
2
A
= BR
A
(p
2
B
)
p
2
A
  p
2
B
= 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1  k)y
p
2
A
  p
2
B
= 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1  k)x
p
2
A
+ p
2
B
= 2u+ 1
Figure 1: Best-response diagram in period 2: interior equilibrium
Figure 1 illustrates the best-response orrespondenes and the equilibrium prie pro-
le when it is in the interior (Case (a)). Lemma 2 also haraterizes the equilibrium of
the one-period game in whih the rms quote pries one and the buyers make a single
purhase deision sine suh a game is equivalent to the period 2 game with x = 0, y = 1
and e
j
(h) = 1=2.
Proposition 3. In the one-period game, the equilibrium prie prole is unique and given
by (p
A
; p
B
) = (1   k; 1   k), and the rms segment the market with rm A apturing
[0; 1=2) and rm B apturing (1=2; 1℄.
Proposition 3 shows that the higher the dependene parameter k, the more intense
is the ompetition between the rms and the lower is the equilibrium prie.
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5 Equilibrium Prie Dynamis
In this setion, we make some ritial observation on the relationship between the period
1 prie and the period 2 pries. Speially, suppose that the period 1 prie is p
1
and that
the buyers' period 1 strategies are given by (3). While the period 2 pries take dierent
values depending on the buyers' deisions in period 1, we show that in equilibrium, for
any prie quote p
1
f
by rm f in period 1 on or o the equilibrium path, the expeted value
of its period 2 prie must equal p
1
f
after the history h = (p
1
; d
1
) 2 H
12
. The derivation
of the equilibrium of the full game in the next setion fully exploits this martingale
property of the prie dynamis.
Lemma 4. (Martingale property) Suppose that (; ; P ) is an equilibrium, and that the
buyers' period 1 strategies 
1
satises (3) for any period 1 prie pair p
1
= (p
1
A
; p
1
B
). Then
for any p
1
, if x = x(p
1
) 2 (0; 1), then the expeted prie of A buyer i will fae in period
2 when he waits equals p
1
A
. Likewise, if y = y(p
1
) 2 (0; 1), then the expeted prie of B
buyer i faes in period 2 when he waits equals p
1
B
:
p
1
A
= E


2
B
(p
1
; ;; d
1
j
)

;
p
1
B
= E


2
B
(p
1
; ;; d
1
j
)

:
Lemma 4 is not an artifat of our assumption that the type distribution is uniform.
Rather, it follows from the general observation that the ritial type x at the lower end of
the interval in period 2 is indierent between the two goods in the B-orner equilibrium,
and that the type y at the higher end is indierent between the two goods in the A-orner
equilibrium.
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More speially, the intuition behind Lemma 4 is as follows: Depending
on the deision of buyer j in period 1, buyer i of the ritial type x may fae either the
interior equilibrium or one of the orner equilibria in period 2 if he hooses to wait. If he
hooses B in period 2 after some deision by j, it implies that the B-orner equilibrium is
in play. Then his payo from hoosing A is just the same as that from hoosing B given
the property of suh an equilibrium. That is, for type x, making an optimal ontingent
hoie in period 2 is equivalent to making an unonditional hoie of A then. On the
other hand, if he always hooses A in period 2 regardless of j's period 1 deision, then by
the law of iterated expetation, the his ex ante expeted valuation of good A in period
2 is just the same as that in period 1. Given that type x is indierent between hoosing
13
Lemma 4 is reminisent of the martingale property found in the sequential aution model of Weber
(1981) although the logi here is unrelated.
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A today and waiting, the expeted prie in period 2 must then be the same as the prie
in period 1. The symmetri argument for type y yields the property of the prie of B.
Equilibrium prie dynamis is one entral topi in the literature on dynami sales.
Bose et al. (2008) and Bhalla (2013) both show in their respetive sequential sales models
that the prie path is a super-martingale in the sense that the ex ante expeted pries
go down with the progress of sales. In a two-period model in whih only one onsumer
arrives in period 1 and may delay, on the other hand, Bhalla (2012) shows that the
pries an either inrease or derease over periods depending on the prior belief about
the quality of the good. In a model of online sales with random arrival of onsumers,
Gallien (2006) shows that the prie path is a sub-martingale. While the prie dynamis
in these models is a derivative property of an equilibrium, the martingale property in
our model is the key building blok of an equilibrium as seen below and must hold both
on and o the equilibrium path.
6 Impossibility of a Preemptive Equilibrium
Before turning to the analysis of the full model, it is useful to rst examine the buyer
behavior in the simplied model in whih the period 2 pries are not ontingent on the
outome of period 1. Speially, suppose that the symmetri prie prole suh that
p
1
A
= p
1
B
in period 1 and p
2
A
= p
2
B
in period 2 is exogenously given. If we write x = x(p
1
)
and y = y(p
1
) in (3), then by symmetry, y = 1 x. Clearly, full delay (i.e., x = 0) takes
plae if p
1
A
> p
2
A
. Hene, suppose that  = p
2
A
 p
1
A
 0. If  > 0, a buyer may delay his
deision only if he intends to make dierent hoies depending on the outome of period
1. Speially, when  > 0, it must be the ase that when buyer i waits but buyer j
hooses either produt in period 1, i's period 2 hoie mimis j's hoie in period 1. In
this ase, any type s
i
2 (x; 1   x) prefers waiting to hoosing A in period 1 if
1  (1  k)s
i
  k
1
2
  p
1
A
 x
n
1  (1  k)s
i
  k
x
2
  p
2
A
o
+ (1  2x)

1  (1  k)s
i
  k
1
2
  p
2
A

+ x
n
(1  k)s
i
+ k

1 
x
2

  p
2
B
o
:
(8)
The left-hand side is i's payo from hoosing A today while the right-hand side is his
payo from waiting: The three terms orrespond to i's hoie of A, A, and B in period 2
when j's deision in period 1 is A, ;, and B, respetively. Sine type s
i
= x is indierent
between A and waiting, the equality should hold in (8) for s
i
= x. Upon simpliation,
14
this equality is equivalent to
(2  3k)x
2
  (1  2k)x  = 0:
Solving for x satisfying x 2
 
0;
1
2

, we obtain
x =
8
<
:
1 2k+
p
(1 2k)
2
+4(2 3k)
2(2 3k)
if  2
 
0;
k
4

,
1 2k
2 3k
if  = 0.
(9)
While the buyer behavior is uniquely desribed by (9) when  > 0, when  = 0, we
an also verify that any x 2
h
0;
1 2k
2 3k
i
is also a valid threshold.
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In this ase, every
type s
i
2

x;
1 2k
2 3k

hooses A in period 2 regardless of j's deision in period 1, and
hene is indierent between waiting and hoosing A in period 1. Note, however, that
only x =
1 2k
2 3k
desribes behavior that is ontinuous in  at  = 0. The following
proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 5. (Buyer behavior along a xed prie path) Suppose that the buyer be-
havior is desribed by (3) under the symmetri and xed prie prole (p
1
; p
2
). Then x
is uniquely given by (9) when  = p
2
A
  p
1
A
> 0, and x 2
h
0;
1 2k
3 2k
i
when  = 0. For
x given in (9), if buyer i waits and buyer j moves in period 1, then i hooses the same
rm as j in period 2, and the probability of delay 1  2x is inreasing in k.
We now proeed to the analysis of the equilibrium of our original model in whih
the period 2 pries are ontingent on the period 1 outome. In this setion, we examine
whether or not the equilibrium an be preemptive in the sense that the rm whih
suessfully attrats one buyer in period 1 also attrats any remaining buyer in period 2.
In other words, along the equilibrium path, the hoie of A by a single buyer in period
1 is followed by the A-orner equilibrium in period 2, and the hoie of B is followed
by the B-orner equilibrium in period 2. As seen in Proposition 5, suh a property
haraterizes buyer behavior under the xed prie path.
Suppose that (; ; P ) is a symmetri preemptive equilibrium. Denote the ritial
types in (3) by x

= x(
1
) and y

= y(
1
) under the equilibrium prie prole 
1
in
period 1. By symmetry, we have y

= 1  x

.
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This follows sine for any suh x, type s
i
< x nds A better than B even after j's hoie of B in
period 1:
1  (1  k)s
i
  k
1 + y
2
  p
2
A
 (1  k)s
i
+ k
1 + y
2
  p
2
B
:
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First, by Lemma 2, the A-orner equilibrium is played after h = (
1
; d
1
) with d
1
=
(;; A) if and only if
1  2k

x

2

 2(1   k) f2(1  x

)  x

g :
This along with y

= 1  x

 x

implies that the relevant range of x

is given by
x

2

3  4k
6  7k
;
1
2

: (10)
By symmetry, this ondition is also neessary and suÆient for the B-orner equilibrium
to be played after h = (
1
; d
1
) with d
1
= (;; B).
Next, by the martingale property (Lemma 4), the period 1 prie 
1
A
(= 
1
B
) equals
the expeted equilibrium prie in period 2:

1
A
= x

f1  kx

  2(1   k)(1  x

)g
+ (1  2x

)
1  k + 2(1  k)(1   3x

)
3
+ x

 0
= (6  7k)(x

)
2
  (5  6k)x

+ 1  k:
(11)
When x

satises (10), the range of 
1
A
is given by

1
A
2

k(1   k)
6  7k
;
k
4

: (12)
Hene, the period 1 prie in a preemptive equilibrium, if any, must be signiantly lower
than, say, the equilibrium prie 1 k in the one-period model. The following proposition
shows that this low prie gives either rm an inentive to deviate and inrease its prie.
In fat, setting a suÆiently high prie in period 1 is a protable deviation although it
implies giving up the market share in period 1.
Proposition 6. (Impossibility of a Preemptive Equilibrium) Suppose that the buyers
behavior in period 1 is desribed by (3). Then there exists no symmetri equilibrium
(; ; P ) suh that the on-the-path period 1 history h = (
1
; d
1
) indues the A-orner
equilibrium if d
1
= (;; A) and the B-orner equilibrium if d
1
= (;; B).
7 Existene of a Non-Preemptive Equilibrium
Having seen in the previous setion that the equilibrium annot be preemptive, we
turn to the alternative possibility where the period 2 equilibrium is always an interior
16
equilibrium. In other words, even if only one rm wins a buyer in period 1, some buyer
types still hoose the other rm in period 2. In this setion, we present the main theorem
of the paper that proves the existene of suh a non-preemptive equilibrium.
Reall that H
i
is the set of histories along whih buyer i waits in period 1. Suppose
now that for some period 1 prie pair p
1
, every history h = (p
1
; d
1
) 2 H
i
indues an
interior equilibrium in period 2. By Lemma 2(a), this holds if and only if
2(1  k)(2x   y)  1  2ke
j
(p
1
; ;; B)
< 1  2ke
j
(p
1
; ;; ;)
< 1  2ke
j
(p
1
; ;; A)  2(1  k)(2y   x):
Substituting e
j
(p
1
; ;; A) =
x
2
and e
j
(p
1
; ;; A) =
1+y
2
and rearranging, we see that these
onditions are equivalent to
4(1   k)x  (2  3k)y  1  k and (2  3k)x  4(1   k)y   1: (13)
Sine E[e
j
(h)℄ =
1
2
, the expeted prie that buyer i will fae in period 2 is then given by
E


2
A
(p
1
; d
1
i
= ;; d
1
j
)

=
1  2kE[e
j
(h)℄ + 2(1  k)(y   2x)
3
= (1  k)
1 + 2(y   2x)
3
;
E


2
B
(p
1
; d
1
i
= ;; d
1
j
)

=
 1 + 2kE[e
j
(h)℄ + 2(1  k)(2y   x)
3
= (1  k)
 1 + 2(2y   x)
3
:
(14)
Hene, by the martingale property (Lemma 4),
p
1
A
= (1  k)
1 + 2(y   2x)
3
; (15)
and
p
1
B
= (1  k)
 1 + 2(2y   x)
3
: (16)
Dene
q
A
=
p
1
A
1  k
and q
B
=
p
1
B
1  k
to be the period 1 pries adjusted by the degree of interdependene. We then have
q
A
=
1
3
(1  4x+ 2y) ; and q
B
=
1
3
( 1 + 4y   2x) :
17
Solving for x and y yields:
x =
1
2
 
2q
A
  q
B
2
;
y =
1
2
+
2q
B
  q
A
2
:
(17)
Write 
2
f
(h) = 
2
f
(
2
(h) j 
2
; h) for rm f 's (per buyer) payo in period 2 along the
history h = (p
1
; d
1
) when the equilibrium strategies 
2
and 
2
are played in period 2. It
readily follows from Lemma 2 that 
2
f
(h) for h = (p
1
; d
1
) 2 H
12
is given by

2
A
(h) =
1
y   x
f1  2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)(y   2x)g
2
18(1  k)
;

2
B
(h) =
1
y   x
f1  2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)(2y   x)g
2
18(1  k)
:
Firm f 's (per buyer) payo 
f
over two periods is then written as:

A
(p
1
j 
2
; ) = p
1
A
x+ (y   x)
h
x
2
A
(p
1
; ;; A)
+ (y   x)
2
A
(p
1
; ;; ;) + (1  y)
2
A
(p
1
; ;; B)
i
;

B
(p
1
j 
2
; ) = p
1
B
(1  y) + (y   x)
h
x
2
B
(p
1
; ;; A)
+ (y   x)
2
B
(p
1
; ;; ;) + (1  y)
2
B
(p
1
; ;; B)
i
:
(18)
Substitution of 
2
A
into (18) yields upon simpliation

A
(p
1
j 
2
; )
= p
1
A
x+
1
18(1   k)
h
(1  k)
2
f1 + 2(y   2x)g
2
+ k
2
y(1  x)(1 + x  y)
i
:
Now rewrite 
f
as a funtion of (q
A
; q
B
):
^

f
(q
A
; q
B
) = 
f
(p
1
j 
2
; ). Substituting
(17), we obtain
^

A
(q
A
; q
B
) = (1  k)q
A

1
2
 
2q
A
  q
B
2

+
1  k
2
q
2
A
+
k
2
18(1   k)

1
2
+
2q
B
  q
A
2

1
2
+
2q
A
  q
B
2

1 
q
A
+ q
B
2

Suppose now that 
1
= (
1
A
; 
1
B
) is the equilibrium prie pair in period 1. If for any
prie pair p
1
in the neighborhood of 
1
, every history h = (p
1
; d
1
) 2 H
i
indues an
interior equilibrium in period 2, then we an identify the equilibrium prie pair 
1
as a
solution to the rst-order onditions of the maximization of
^

A
and the orresponding
payo funtion
^

B
of rm B. Furthermore, if the equilibrium prie pair is symmetri
(q
A
; q
B
) = (q; q), then q must satisfy

^

A
q
A
(q; q) = 0. The following theorem identies an
equilibrium through this onsideration.
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Theorem 7. (Non-preemptive equilibrium) Let q be given by
q =
8
<
:
 36(1 k)
2
 k
2
+
p
f36(1 k)
2
+k
2
g
2
+3k
2
f72(1 k)
2
+k
2
g
3k
2
if k > 0,
1 if k = 0.
(19)
There exists a symmetri equilibrium (; ; P ) in whih the rms quote 
1
A
= 
1
B
=
(1   k)q in period 1 and the buyers' period 1 strategies 
1
i
on the equilibrium path are
desribed by (3) for x =
1 q
2
and y =
1+q
2
.
The proof in the Appendix onstruts the equilibrium by speifying the buyer re-
sponse to every o-equilibrium prie pair in period 1. For a period 1 prie pair that
orresponds to a unilateral deviation, this onstrution determines the protability of
the deviation. For illustration, suppose that rm A unilaterally deviates and slightly
uts its prie in period 1. This deviation is followed by higher values of the thresholds x
and y: More buyer types immediately hoose A, and less buyer types immediately hoose
B. These thresholds then determine the ative buyer types in the period 2 market and
the payo of the deviating rm there. Hene, the protability of the prie ut in period
1 depends on the hange in immediate sales in period 1 as well as on the hange in the
payo in period 2, both of whih are aused by the hange in the thresholds x and y.
Evaluation of the protability of a deviation hene requires the exat identiation of
the thresholds based on the martingale property.
Given that the equilibrium prie in the one period model equals 1 k as seen earlier,
we an interpret q as a disount in response to the inreased bargaining power of the
buyers with an option to wait until period 2.
As an be readily veried from (26) and as illustrated in Figure 2, the adjusted prie

1
f
1  k
= q
is dereasing in the dependene parameter k. We an interpret this as the rms' response
to the stronger inentive of the more interdependent onsumers to delay their deisions.
Note that when the buyers are ompletely independent so that k = 0, the equilibrium
in Theorem 7 entails full delay sine x = 0 and y = 1.
15
On the other hand, when k = 0,
there exists another equilibrium with no delay as follows: The rms quote 
1
= (1; 1)
in period 1, and all buyer types move in period 1: Type s
i
hooses A if s
i
<
1
2
and
B if s
i
>
1
2
. The onditional distribution P
i
( j h) when either buyer waits (i.e., after
any h 2 H
12
) is the same as the prior (i.e., the uniform distribution over [0; 1℄). Sine
15
When the buyers disount the period 2 payos by Æ < 1, we an show that the equilibrium with
k = 0 involves delay when Æ is large. This equilibrium approahes the full delay equilibrium as Æ ! 1.
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Figure 2: q as a funtion of k.
the period 2 equilibrium prie pair along any suh history is again (1; 1), and sine the
buyers have no inentive to learn from the behavior of the other, their deision in period
1 not to wait is optimal. When k > 0, however, there is no equilibrium of this type. If
every buyer type moves in period 1 and if the prie in period 2 is the same as that in
period 1, then there exists a buyer type who has an inentive to wait and see. In other
words, only the rst equilibrium for k = 0 is robust to a small perturbation in the value
of k.
8 Delay and EÆieny
Aording to Theorem 7, the proportion of types who wait in period 1 is given by
1   x  (1   y) = q, whih is a dereasing funtion of k as seen above. Hene, we have
the following orollary.
Corollary 8. (Delay as a funtion of k) In the equilibrium of Theorem 7, the probability
of delay by either buyer equals q and dereases as they beome more interdependent.
Corollary 8 appears ounter-intuitive sine in general, the more interdependent is a
buyer, the stronger is his inentive to learn from the behavior of the other buyer. In
fat, we have seen in Proposition 5 that a higher degree of interdependene implies a
20
larger delay when the period 2 prie is not ontingent on history. At rst glane, it may
seem that the smaller delay by a more interdependent buyer in Corollary 8 is aused by
a lower adjusted prie

1
f
1 k
= q in period 1 assoiated with a higher k. However, beause
of the martingale property (Lemma 4) and (14), the expeted adjusted prie in period
2 also equals
1
1  k
E


2
f
(h)

= 1  2x = q for h 2 H
12
;
and is lowered by the same margin. Hene, the lower prie in period 1 alone does not
explain the derease in delay in Corollary 8. Rather, the intuition is that in order to
sustain the lower expeted prie in period 2, the threshold value x needs to be larger sine
q and x are inversely related as seen above: The larger is x, the smaller the interval of
ative buyer types in period 2, and the more intense the ompetition between the rms.
Sine a higher x is by denition equivalent to less delay, we have Corollary 8.
We next turn to the (in)eÆieny of the buyer deisions in equilibrium. First, the
fully eÆient outome is obtained when the two buyers make their deisions after truth-
fully sharing private information about their types. Aordingly,
buyer i should hoose
8
<
:
A if u
i
> v
i
, (1  k)s
i
+ ks
j
<
1
2
,
B if u
i
< v
i
, (1  k)s
i
+ ks
j
>
1
2
.
After some algebra, we an verify that the expeted value of the ex post optimal deision
is given by
E [max fu
i
; v
i
g℄ = E [max f1  (1  k)s
i
  ks
j
; (1  k)s
i
+ ks
j
g℄ =
3
4
:
In the equilibrium of Theorem 7, on the other hand,
buyer i hooses
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
A if s
i
<  and s
j
< x,
s
i
<
1
2
and s
j
2 (x; 1  x),
or s
i
< 1   and s
j
> 1  x,
B if s
i
>  and s
j
< x,
s
i
>
1
2
and s
j
2 (x; 1  x),
or s
i
> 1   and s
j
> 1  x,
where x =
1 q
2
, and  =
2 k(1 q)
12(1 k)
+
1
3
is the ritial type of buyer i that is indierent
between A and B in the period 2 market when j hooses A in period 1 (i.e., after
h = (
1
; ;; A)). By symmetry, the ritial type of i indierent between A and B in period
2 when j hooses B in period 1 is given by 1  . The ex post optimal and equilibrium
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si
s
j
1
2
x
x
1  x
1  x
(1  k)s
i
+ ks
j
=
1
2
A
B
A
B

1  
0
1
1
0
Figure 3: Optimal and equilibrium deisions by buyer i
deisions are illustrated in Figure 8. The shaded areas in the gure represent the signal
realizations that lead to ineÆient deisions.
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The expeted value of the equilibrium deisions is hene given by
Z
x
0

Z

0
v
i
ds
i
+
Z
1

w
i
ds
i

ds
j
+
Z
1
1 x

Z
1 
0
v
i
ds
i
+
Z
1
1 
w
i
ds
i

ds
j
+
Z
1 x
x
(
Z 1
2
0
v
i
ds
i
+
Z
1
1
2
w
i
ds
i
)
ds
j
= 2

x+
1
2
(1  k)(1  2
2
)x+
k
2
(1  2)x
2

+
3  k
4
(1  2x):
(20)
As seen in Figure 4, the eÆieny of the equilibrium buyer deisions is stritly de-
reasing in the dependene parameter k. This is expeted from Corollary 8 sine more
interdependent buyers tend to move in period 1 more often.
9 Disussions
Throughout the paper, we have onned ourselves to the model with no disounting. An
alternative interpretation of the no disounting assumption is that period 1 orresponds
16
Indiated in the shaded areas are the (ineÆient) equilibrium ations.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium eÆieny as a funtion of k.
to an advane sales period of the produt.
17
In this ase, the onsumption of the produt
takes plae only after period 2 even if it is purhased in period 1. When there is positive
disounting, the most signiant hange takes plae in the martingale property. It is then
stated as the indierene ondition for the ritial type x between hoosing A in period
1 and waiting and then unonditionally hoosing A in period 2, and the ondition for
type y between B in period 1 and the unonditional hoie of B in period 2. With this
hange, however, we expet the equilibrium under disounting to approah that under
no disounting as the disount fator approahes one. We have not pursued this formally
sine the equation haraterizing the equilibrium prie as well as the speiation of the
o-equilibrium behavior is signiantly more omplex, and sine this exerise does not
appear to add new insights.
The assumption of the uniform distribution of the types is standard in the models of
produt dierentiation and perhaps is the only one that admits analytial derivation of
the equilibrium in our framework. While we admit that the assumption is restritive in
some ways, we also note that the speiation of the distribution beomes less important
when the degree of dierentiation beomes small ompared with the absolute values of
the produts as represented by the onstant u in the valuation funtion. Furthermore, our
result suggests that problems with alternative distributions an be numerially analyzed
17
See for example Yu et al. (2011).
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with the help of the martingale property.
Unlike in the majority of the soial learning literature that assumes that a onsumer's
type s
i
is a noisy signal of the underlying state !, we have adopted an alternative
framework in whih there is no ! and the onsumer types s
1
and s
2
are independent.
In defense of our assumption, we should note that a few tehnial problems would arise
under the alternative assumption of orrelated signals. First, we would need to speify
a family of onditional distributions of the signal for eah state !. Speiation of
suh onditional distributions is nontrivial and any speiation would involve far more
ompliated analysis if possible at all.
18
Seond, if the rms do not know the realization
of !, then we should onsider the rms' inentive to learn ! through their priing
strategy. If they know !, on the other hand, we should think about their signaling
inentives. Our assumption helps us abstrat from these onsiderations, whih ould
signiantly ompliate the problem.
In one interesting extension, we an onsider a model in whih the onsumers are
dierent in their interdependene levels. Targeting a partiular lass of onsumers is
shown to be a useful sales strategy in dierent ontexts, and it would be interesting to
examine if this is also the ase in the present setting.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Sine the onditional probability P
i
( j h) of s
i
given h 2 H
i
is
the uniform distribution over the interval (x; y), rm A's payo from buyer i in period
2 is expliitly given by:

2
A;i
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
p
2
A
y x

1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
  x

if
u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k

1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
2 (x; y),
p
2
A
y x

u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
  x

if
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)

u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
2 (x; y),
p
2
A
if min
n
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
;
u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
o
 y,
0 if min
n
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
;
u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
o
 x,
18
One possibility is the binary speiation of the signal. However, we have the problem of having no
pure equilibrium in a stage game in this ase.
19
In a model where the dependene levels of onsumers are observable to a monopolist seller, Aoyagi
(2010) shows that it is optimal for the seller to target the least dependent onsumers rst and then move
in the inreasing order of the dependene levels.
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and rm B's payo from buyer i is given by:

2
B;i
(p
2
j 
2
; h) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
p
2
B
y x

y  
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)

if
 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k

1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
2 (x; y),
p
2
B
y x

y  
 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k

if
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)

 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k
2 (x; y),
0 if max
n
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
;
 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k
o
 y,
p
2
B
if max
n
1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
;
 u ke
j
(h)+p
2
B
1 k
o
 x.
We assume in the rest of the proof that u > 2(1   k) to avoid tedious ase separation
in the desription of the best response that is immaterial to the desription of the
equilibrium.
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Let R
1
; : : : ; R
4
be the sets of prie proles (p
2
A
; p
2
B
) as illustrated in Figure 1. Ex-
pliitly, they are the set of (p
2
A
; p
2
B
) satisfying p
2
A
, p
2
B
 0, and
R
1
: 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1  k)y  p
2
A
  p
2
B
 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1   k)x;
p
2
A
+ p
2
B
 2u+ 1;
R
2
: u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)y  p
2
A
 u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)x;
p
2
A
+ p
2
B
 2u+ 1;
R
3
: p
2
A
< u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)y;
p
2
A
  p
2
B
< 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1   k)y;
R
4
: p
2
A
> min

p
2
B
+ 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1  k)x; u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)x
	
:
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This ondition ensures that the intersetion between p
2
A
  p
2
B
= 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1   k)x and p
2
B
=
 1+2ke
j
(h)+2(1 k)y+p
2
A
2
given by
(p
2
A
; p
2
B
) = (1  2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)(y   2x); 2(1   k)(y   x)) ;
and the intersetion between p
2
A
 p
2
B
= 1 2ke
j
(h) 2(1 k)y and p
2
A
=
1 2ke
j
(h) 2(1 k)x+p
2
B
2
given by
(p
2
A
; p
2
B
) = (2(1   k)(y   x);  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)(2y   x)) ;
are both below the partiipation onstraint line p
2
A
+ p
2
B
= 2u + 1 so that the diagram is as depited
in Figure 1. The ondition u > 1   k implied by this ensures that the maximum of 
2
A
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h)
over R
2
is ahieved at the left-end of the region at p
2
A
= u + 1   ke
j
(h)   (1   k)y, and also that the
maximum of 
2
A
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h) over the orresponding set is ahieved at the lower-end of the region at
p
2
B
= u+ ke
j
(h) + (1  k)x so that the best response funtions are as desribed in Figure 1.
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We an express 
2
A;i
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h) in terms of these sets as

2
A;i
(p
2
j 
2
i
; h) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
p
2
A
y x

1 2ke
j
(h) p
2
A
+p
2
B
2(1 k)
  x

if (p
2
A
; p
2
B
) 2 R
1
,
p
2
A
y x

u+1 ke
j
(h) p
2
A
1 k
  x

if (p
2
A
; p
2
B
) 2 R
2
,
p
2
A
if (p
2
A
; p
2
B
) 2 R
3
,
0 if (p
2
A
; p
2
B
) 2 R
4
.
It follows that rm A's period 2 best response orrespondene is given by
BR
A
(p
2
B
) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
R
+
if 0  p
2
B
< max f0;  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)xg,
n
1 2ke
j
(h) 2(1 k)x+p
2
B
2
o
if p
2
B
 max f0;  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)xg, and
p
2
B
< max f0;  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)(2y   x)g,
n
1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1   k)y + p
2
B
o
if p
2
B
 max f0;  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)(2y   x)g, and
p
2
B
 u+ ke
j
(h) + (1  k)y,
n
u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)y
o
if p
2
B
> u+ ke
j
(h) + (1  k)y.
Likewise, rm B's period 2 best response orrespondene is given by
BR
B
(p
2
A
) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
R
+
if 0  p
2
A
< max f1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1  k)y; 0g,
n
 1+2ke
j
(h)+2(1 k)y+p
2
A
2
o
if p
2
A
 max f1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1   k)y; 0g, and
p
2
A
< max f0; 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1  k)(2x   y)g,
n
1  2ke
j
  2(1  k)x+ p
2
A
o
if p
2
A
 max f0; 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1   k)(2x  y)g, and
p
2
A
< u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)x,
n
u+ ke
j
(h) + (1  k)x
o
if p
2
B
 u+ 1  ke
j
(h)  (1  k)x.
Figure 1 depits these best response orrespondenes for the ase 2(1   k)x < 1  
2ke
j
(h) < 2(1   k)y. Note also that when p
2
A
  p
2
B
 1   2ke
j
(h)   2(1   k)y, rm A
monopolizes the market under (p
2
A
; p
2
B
), and that when p
2
A
  p
2
B
 1   2ke
j
(h)   2(1  
k)x, rm B monopolizes the market under (p
2
A
; p
2
B
). Note also that the partiipation
onstraint does not bind for the ritial type that is indierent between rms A and B
if p
2
A
+ p
2
B
< 2u+ 1.
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a) 1  2ke
j
(h) 2 [2(1  k)(2x   y); 2(1   k)(2y   x)℄.
The best response orrespondenes p
2
A
= BR
A
(p
2
B
) and p
2
B
= BR
B
(p
2
A
) have a unique
intersetion

1  2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)(y   2x)
3
;
 1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)(2y   x)
3

;
whih satises 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1  k)x < p
2
A
  p
2
B
< 1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1  k)y and also
p
2
A
+ p
2
B
< 2u+1 when u >
1
2
  k. Hene, the two rms segment the market and the
ritial type is given by s
i
=
1 2ke
j
(h)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3
.
b) 1  2ke
j
(h) > 2(1  k)(2y   x).
p
2
A
p
2
B
p
2
B
= BR
B
(p
2
A
)p
2
A
= BR
A
(p
2
B
)
p
2
A
  p
2
B
= 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1  k)y
p
2
A
  p
2
B
= 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1  k)x
p
2
A
+ p
2
B
= 2u+ 1
Figure 5: Best-response diagram: A-orner equilibrium
As seen in Figure 5, the unique xed point of the joint best-response orrespondene
(p
2
A
; p
2
B
)
 
BR
A
(p
2
B
); BR
B
(p
2
A
)

is given by
(1  2ke
j
(h)  2(1  k)y; 0) :
Sine p
2
A
  p
2
B
= 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1   k)y, rm A monopolizes the market.
) 1  2ke
j
(h) < 2(1  k)(2x   y).
As in the previous ase, the unique xed point of the joint best-response orrespon-
dene (p
2
A
; p
2
B
)
 
BR
A
(p
2
B
); BR
B
(p
2
A
)

is given by
(0;  1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1   k)x) :
Sine p
2
A
  p
2
B
 1  2ke
j
(h)   2(1   k)x, rm B monopolizes the market.
This ompletes the proof. 
27
Proof of Lemma 1. We will show that if 
1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = A for some s
i
and s
0
i
< s
i
, then

i
(s
0
i
; p
1
) = A. By setting x(p
1
) = sup

s
i
: 
1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = A
	
, it would then follow that

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = A if s
i
< x.
Suppose that 
1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = A and that s
0
i
< s
i
. Sine type s
i
prefers hoosing A to
hoosing B in period 1, we have
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
℄  p
1
A
 E
s
j
[w
i
j s
i
℄  p
1
B
: (21)
Likewise, sine type s
i
prefers hoosing A in period 1 to waiting and then hoosing either
A, ;, or B in period 2, we also have
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
℄  p
1
A
 Æ
X
h2H
i
P (h) max

E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
; h℄   
2
A
(h); 0; E
s
j
[w
i
j s
i
; h℄  
2
B
(h)
	
;
(22)
where H
i
(p
1
) =

h = (p
1
; d
1
) : d
1
i
= ;
	
is the set of period 1 histories along whih the
rms quote p
1
and buyer i hooses to wait. Note now that
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
0
i
℄ = (1  k)(s
i
  s
0
i
) +E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
℄ > E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
℄; and
E
s
j
[w
i
j s
0
i
℄ =  (1  k)(s
i
  s
0
i
) +E
s
j
[w
i
j s
i
℄ < E
s
j
[w
i
j s
i
℄:
It then immediately follows that (21) holds for type s
0
i
so that it stritly prefers hoosing
A to hoosing B in period 1. To see that s
0
i
also prefers hoosing A to waiting, add
(1  k)(s
i
  s
0
i
) to both sides of (22). We then have
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
0
i
℄  p
1
A
 (1  Æ)(1   k)(s
i
  s
0
i
)
+ Æ
X
h2H
i
P (h) max
n
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
0
i
; h℄  
2
A
(h); (1  k)(s
i
  s
0
i
);
(1  k)(s
i
  s
0
i
) +E
s
j
[w
i
j s
i
; h℄  
2
B
(h)
o
> Æ
X
h2H
i
P (h) max

E
s
j
[v
i
j s
0
i
; h℄  
2
A
(h); 0; E
s
j
[w
i
j s
0
i
; h℄  
2
B
(h)
	
;
whih shows that (22) holds for type s
0
i
with strit inequality, and hene it stritly
prefers hoosing A to waiting. It an be shown similarly that there exists y suh that

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = B if s
i
> y. If s
i
2 (x; y), then we annot have 
1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = A sine that
would imply 
1
i
(s
0
i
; p
1
) = A for some s
0
i
> x, a ontradition. Sine we annot have

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = B either, we must have 
1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = ;. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We rst show that if 
2
(h) is as given by Lemma 2, then after any
d
1
j
, type x's payo from unonditionally hoosing A in period 2 equals that from following
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the sequentially rational strategy 
2
i
: E
s
j


2
i
(x; s
j
; 
2
(h); 
2
i
(x; h; 
2
(h)) j s
i
; h

, where
h = (p
1
; ;; d
1
j
). For this, note that type x is the lowest type in the period 2 market. Hene,
after any deision d
1
j
of buyer j, if d
1
= (;; d
1
j
) is followed by an interior equilibrium or an
A-orner equilibrium (Lemma 2), then type x will optimally hoose A in period 2 after
d
1
. On the other hand, if d
1
is followed by a B-orner equilibrium, then type x is just
indierent between A and B after h = (p
1
; d
1
): When 1   2ke
j
(h) < 2(1   k)(2x   y),
(7) implies that
type x's payo from hoosing A
= u+ 1  (1  k)x  ke
j
(h)  0
= u+ (1  k)x+ ke
j
(h)   ( 1 + 2ke
j
(h) + 2(1  k)x)
= type x's payo from hoosing B.
It follows that in period 2, hoosing A unonditionally is optimal for type x regardless
of buyer j's deision d
1
j
or the type of equilibrium that follows d
1
. This in turn implies
that type x's payo from waiting in period 1 equals that from waiting and then unon-
ditionally hoosing A in period 2. Now in period 1, if x > 0 and waiting is stritly better
than hoosing A, then for  > 0 small, type s
i
= x    > 0 also nds it stritly better
o waiting, whih is a ontradition to the sequential rationality of 
1
i
. On the other
hand, if x < 1 and hoosing A in period 1 is stritly better than waiting, then for  > 0
small, type s
i
= x +  < 1 nds it stritly better o hoosing A in period 1, whih is
again a ontradition to the sequential rationality of 
1
i
. Hene, type s
i
= x is indierent
between hoosing A and waiting in period 1. Combining the two observations together,
we have
E [v
i
j s
i
= x℄  p
1
A
= E
h
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
= x; h℄  
2
A
(h)



s
i
= x
i
;
where the left-hand side is buyer i's payo from buying A in period 1, and the right-
hand side is his payo from waiting and then unonditionally hoosing A in period 2.
However, sine we have by the law of iterated expetations
E [v
i
j s
i
= x℄ = E
h
E
s
j
[v
i
j s
i
= x; h℄



s
i
= x
i
;
the above implies that
p
1
A
= E


2
A
(p
1
; ;; d
1
j
)

:
The symmetri disussion proves the statement for the prie of B. 
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Proof of Proposition 6. Dene q =

A
1
1 k
=

1
B
1 k
to be the adjusted period 1 prie in
equilibrium. It follows from (12) that the range of q is given by
q 2

k
6  7k
;
k
4(1  k)

: (23)
Firm A's payo over two periods under (q; q) is given by
^

A
(q; q)
= (1  k)qx

+ (1  2x

)
h
x


2
A
(
1
; ;; A) + (1  2x

)
2
A
(
1
; ;; ;)
i
= x

(6  7k)(x

)
2
  (5  6k)x

+ 1  k
	
+ (1  2x

)x

f1  kx

  2(1  k)(1   x

)g
+ (1  2x

)
f1  k + 2(1  k)(1   2x

)g
2
18(1   k)
= ( 2 + 3k)(x

)
3
+ (5  7k)(x

)
2
+ ( 3 + 4k)x

+
1  k
2
 '(x

):
Sine ' is onvex over
h
0;
5 7k
3(2 3k)
i
, and sine 0 <
2
5
<
3 4k
6 7k
<
1
2
<
5 7k
3(2 3k)
, for x

satisfying (10), we have
'(x

)  max

'

1
2

; '

2
5

= max

k
8
;
 7 + 43k
250

=
k
8
:
Consider now rm A's deviation from 
1
A
to p
1
A
> u+1. Dene q
A
=
p
1
A
1 k
, x = x(p
1
A
; 
1
B
)
and y = y(p
1
A
; 
1
B
). It is lear that no buyer hooses A in period 1 and hene x = 0. On
the other hand, the martingale property (Lemma 4) under the prie pair (p
1
A
; (1   k)q)
implies that
(1  k)q = y
 1 + ky + 2(1   k)  2y
3
+ (1  y)
 1 + k(1 + y) + 2(1  k)  2y
3
;
or equivalently,
y =
1 + 3q
4
: (24)
Firm A's payo over the two periods under (q
A
; q) is given by
^

A
(q
A
; q) = y
f1  ky + 2(1  k)yg
2
18(1   k)
+ (1  y)
f1  k(1 + y) + 2(1   k)yg
2
18(1  k)
=
1
18(1   k)

4(1  k)
2
  k
2
	
y
2
+

4(1   k)
2
+ k
2
	
y + (1  k)
2

:
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Sine y >
1
4
by (24), we have
^

A
(q
A
; q) >
1
18(1   k)

9
4
(1  k)
2
+
3
16
k
2


1
8
(1  k): (25)
It follows from (9) and (25) that for any q satisfying (23),
^

A
(q
A
; q) >
^

A
(q; q):
Hene, 
1
A
= (1  k)q annot be an equilibrium prie for rm A. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider the following pair of a strategy prole (; ) and
onditional beliefs P
i
( j h) is a symmetri equilibrium of the two-period model.
  Period 1 strategies:
For q given in (26), rm f quotes

1
f
= (1  k)q; (26)
and for any p
1
= (p
1
A
; p
1
B
) and (q
A
; q
B
) =

p
1
A
1 k
;
p
1
B
1 k

, buyer i's deision is given by (3)
for x and y dened as follows:
1. If max fq
A
; q
B
g >
3 2k
6(1 k)
, 2q
A
  q
B
 1, and 2q
B
  q
A
 1, then
x =
1  2q
A
+ q
B
2
and y =
1 + 2q
B
  q
A
2
:
2. If
k
4 3k
 q
A
 1 and q
B
 max
n
3 2k
6(1 k)
;
q
A
+1
2
o
, then
x =
3(1   q
A
)
4
and y = 1:
3. If q
A
<
k
4 3k
and q
B

3 2k
6(1 k)
, then
x =
3  2k +
p
(3  2k)
2
  12(4   3k)(1   k)q
A
2(4   3k)
and y = 1:
4. If
k
4 3k
 q
B
 1 and q
A
 max
n
3 2k
6(1 k)
;
q
B
+1
2
o
, then
x = 0 and y = 1 
3(1  q
B
)
4
:
31
5. If q
B
<
k
4 3k
and q
A

3 2k
6(1 k)
, then
x = 0 and y = 1 
3  2k +
p
(3  2k)
2
  12(4   3k)(1   k)q
B
2(4   3k)
:
6. If min fq
A
; q
B
g > 1, then
x = 0 and y = 1:
7. If max fq
A
; q
B
g <
3 2k
6(1 k)
, then
x = y =
1  q
A
+ q
B
2
:
  Beliefs:
The onditional distributionP
i
( j h) about buyer i's type s
i
given history h = (p
1
; d
1
)
is derived through Bayes' rule if buyer i hooses d
1
i
with positive probability when faed
with p
1
: P
 

1
i
(s
i
; p
1
) = d
1
i

> 0. Otherwise, P
i
( j h) equals the prior and is given by
the uniform distribution over [0; 1℄.
  Period 2 strategies:
Let e
j
(h) = E
s
j
[s
j
j h℄ denote the expeted value of s
j
aording to the onditional
distribution P
s
j
( j h) speied above. Then the rms' strategy prole 
2
in period 2 is
given as in Lemma 2, and eah buyer's strategy is given by (2).
Figure 6 illustrates the lassiation of the period 1 prie pair (q
A
; q
B
) =

p
1
A
1 k
;
p
1
B
1 k

in Theorem 7. Note that the equilibrium prie pair in period 1 belongs to R
1
.
It is lear from the disussion in the preeding setion that the period 2 strategies
of the rms and buyers are optimal. In what follows, we rst show that the period 1
strategies of the buyers are optimal, and then show that the rms' period 1 prie quote
(26) is also optimal given the buyers' strategies. In what follows, given any prie pair
p
1
and deision pair d
1
in period 1, let p
2
f
(d
1
) = 
2
f
(p
1
; d
1
) denote the prie quoted by
rm f after history h = (p
1
; d
1
).
Step 1. We rst examine the optimality of the buyers' period 1 strategies for eah
period 1 prie prole as lassied in Figure 6.
1. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
1
: max fq
A
; q
B
g >
3 2k
6(1 k)
, 2q
A
  q
B
 1, and 2q
B
  q
A
 1.
Substituting
x =
1  2q
A
+ q
B
2
and y =
1 + 2q
B
  q
A
2
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qA
q
B
1
1
3 2k
6(1 k)
3 2k
6(1 k)
2q
B
  q
A
= 1
2q
A
  q
B
= 1
(6  5k)q
B
  2kq
A
= k
(6  5k)q
A
  2kq
B
= k
k
4 3k
k
4 3k
R
1
R
2
R
3
R
4
R
5
R
7
R
6
Figure 6: Classiation of the period 1 prie pair (q
A
; q
B
).
into the onditions (13) ensuring the interior equilibrium in period 2 after every
d
1
(i.e., d
1
= (;; A), (;; ;), and (;; B)), we obtain
(6  5k)q
A
  2kq
B
 k; and (6  5k)q
B
  2kq
A
 k: (27)
As is lear from Figure 6, (q
A
; q
B
) under onsideration satises these onditions.
The period 2 equilibrium pries are then given by (6) for eah d
1
, and the expeted
period 2 prie is given by (14).
Note from (15) and (16) that when Æ = 1, (x; y) is hosen so that the period 1
prie of good f equals its expeted period 2 prie. In other words, for f = A and
B,
p
1
f
= xp
2
f
(;; A) + (y   x)p
2
f
(;; ;) + (1  y)p
2
f
(;; B):
We will now examine buyer i's inentive depending on his type s
i
. Note rst that
the following inequalities hold under (27):
x 
1  k(1 + y)
6(1   k)
+
x+ y
3
<
1  k(x+ y)
6(1  k)
+
x+ y
3
<
1  kx
6(1   k)
+
x+ y
3
 y: (28)
In the above, s
i
< x implies that s
i
hooses A in period 1, and s
i
> y implies
that s
i
hooses B in period 1. On the other hand, Lemma 2 implies that the three
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quantities in the middle are the ritial types s
i
of buyer i who are indierent
between A and B in period 2 after buyer j's hoie of d
1
j
= B, ; and A in period 1,
respetively. It follows that there are the following six ases to onsider depending
on buyer i's deision over two periods.
 Type s
i
hooses A in period 1 , s
i
< x.
It follows from (28) that any suh type, if fored to wait in period 1, would
hoose A in period 2 regardless of buyer j's deision in period 1. If type s
i
hooses A in period 1, his expeted payo equals
E [v
i
j s
i
℄  p
1
A
:
By Lemma 4, however, the above is also type s
i
's expeted payo from waiting
and then hoosing A after any d
1
j
. Hene, hoosing A in period 1 is just as
good as waiting, and is optimal.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses A in period 2 regardless of buyer
j's deision d
1
j
: s
i
2

x;
1 k(1+y)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3

.
Any suh type s
i
prefers A to B if fored to move in period 1 sine
1  q
A
+ q
B
2
=
1
6
+
x+ y
3
<
1  k(1 + y)
6(1  k)
+
x+ y
3
:
It then follows from the same logi as above that any suh type is indierent
between hoosing A and waiting in period 1. Hene, waiting is optimal for s
i
.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses A if d
1
j
= A or ;, and B if d
1
j
= B:
s
i
2

1 k(1+y)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3
;
1 k(x+y)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3

.
Let p
2
A
(d
1
) = 
2
A
(p
1
; d
1
). Then type s
i
's deision in period 2 implies:
E
s
j

v
i
j p
1
; d
1
j
= A

  p
2
A
(;; A)  E
s
j

w
i
j p
1
; d
1
j
= A

  p
2
B
(;; A);
E
s
j

v
i
j p
1
; d
1
j
= ;

  p
2
A
(;; ;)  E
s
j

w
i
j p
1
; d
1
j
= ;

  p
2
B
(;; ;);
E
s
j

w
i
j p
1
; d
1
j
= B

  p
2
B
(;; B)  E
s
j

v
i
j p
1
; d
1
j
= B

  p
2
A
(;; B):
Hene, type s
i
's payo from waiting is greater than or equal to his payo from
hoosing A after any d
1
j
or hoosing B after any d
1
j
. Sine his payo from
hoosing A in period 1 equals that from waiting and then hoosing A after
any d
1
j
(Lemma 4), and likewise his payo from hoosing B in period 1 equals
that from waiting and then hoosing B after any d
1
j
, we see that waiting in
period 1 is optimal for any suh type s
i
.
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 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses A if d
1
j
= A and B if ; or d
1
j
= B:
s
i
2

1 k(x+y)
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3
;
1 kx
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3

.
By the same logi as above, type s
i
's payo from waiting in period 1 is greater
than or equal to hoosing either A or B in period 1.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses B after any d
1
j
: s
i
2

1 kx
6(1 k)
+
x+y
3
; y

.
 Type s
i
hooses B in period 1: s
i
> y.
By the same logi as in the rst two ases, hoosing B and waiting in period
1 are both optimal for any type in these two intervals.
2. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
2
:
k
4 3k
 q
A
 1 and q
B
 max
n
3 2k
6(1 k)
;
q
A
+1
2
o
.
Sine y = 1, d
1
j
= B ours with probability zero. We an see that when
x =
3(1   q
A
)
4
and y = 1;
q
A

k
4 3k
is equivalent to the ondition
1  k(x+ y)  2(1   k)(2x   y);
whih ensures the interior equilibrium in period 2 after d
1
= (;; A) and (;; ;).
Furthermore, q
A

k
4 3k
also implies
x 
1  k(x+ 1)
6(1  k)
+
x+ 1
3
<
1  kx
6(1  k)
+
x+ 1
3
 1:
The two quantities in the middle are the ritial types of buyer i who are indierent
between A and B in period 2 after d
1
j
= ; and d
1
j
= A, respetively. Therefore, we
need to hek the optimality of i's behavior in the following four ases.
 Type s
i
hooses A in period 1: s
i
< x.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses A after d
1
j
= A or ;: s
i
2

x;
1 k(x+1)
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3

.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses A after d
1
j
= A and hooses B
after d
1
j
= ;: s
i
2

1 k(x+1)
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3
;
1 kx
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3

.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then hooses B after d
1
j
= A or ;: s
i
>
1 kx
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3
.
The disussion is essentially idential to that in the rst ase and hene is omitted.
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3. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
3
: q
A
<
k
4 3k
and q
B

3 2k
6(1 k)
.
When
x =
3  2k +
p
(3  2k)
2
  12(4   3k)(1   k)q
A
2(4   3k)
and y = 1;
q
A
<
k
4 3k
implies that x 2

3(1 k)
4 3k
;
3 2k
4 3k

. It then follows that
1  2ke
j
(p
1
; ;; ;) = 1  k(x+ 1) < 2(1  k)(2x   1); and
1  2ke
j
(p
1
; ;; A) = 1  kx > 2(1   k)(2x  1):
By Lemma 2, hene, (d
1
i
; d
1
j
) = (;; ;) is followed by a B-orner equilibrium and
(d
1
i
; d
1
j
) = (;; A) is followed by an interior equilibrium in period 2. Furthermore,
the expeted prie of B in period 2 equals
E

p
2
B
(d
1
)

= xp
2
B
(;; A) + (1  x)p
2
B
(;; ;)
= x
 1 + kx+ 2(1  k)(2   x)
3
+ (1  x) f 1 + k(1 + x) + 2(1  k)xg
=
 3(1  k) + 2x(6  5k)   2x
2
(4  3k)
3
=  
2
3
(4  3k)

x 
6  5k
2(4  3k)

2
+
(6  5k)
2
6(4  3k)
  (1  k)

(6  5k)
2
6(4   3k)
  (1  k):
On the other hand, sine q
B

3 2k
6(1 k)
, p
1
B

3 2k
6
, the expeted prie of B in
period 2 is lower than p
1
B
if
(6  5k)
2
6(4  3k)
  (1  k) <
3  2k
6
, k 2 (0; 1):
Therefore, any type s
i
is better o waiting and hoosing B in period 2 after any
d
1
j
than hoosing B in period 1. Furthermore, sine x <
3 2k
4 3k
,
x <
1  k(x+ 1)
6(1  k)
+
x+ 1
3
<
1  kx
6(1  k)
+
x+ 1
3
 1;
where the two quantities in the middle are the ritial types who are indierent
between A and B in period 2 after d
1
j
= ; and d
1
j
= A, respetively. It follows that
there are the following four possibilities to onsider.
 Type s
i
hooses A in period 1: s
i
< x.
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 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then in period 2 hooses A after d
1
j
= A or
d
1
j
= ;: s
i
2

x;
1 k(1+x)
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3

.
By onstrution, hoosing A in period 1 yields the same payo as waiting
and then hoosing A after any d
1
j
. On the other hand, waiting in period 1 is
at least as good as waiting and then hoosing B after any d
1
j
, and the latter
dominates hoosing B in period 1 by the above disussion. Hene, hoosing
A and waiting are both optimal in period 1 for any type in the above two
ases.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then in period 2 hooses A after d
1
j
= A and
hooses B after d
1
j
= ;: s
i
2

1 k(1+x)
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3
;
1 kx
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3

.
 Type s
i
waits in period 1 and then in period 2 hooses B after d
1
j
= A or ;:
s
i
>
1 kx
6(1 k)
+
x+1
3
.
In these two ases, type s
i
prefers hoosing B in period 2 after some d
1
j
to
hoosing A after any d
1
j
. By onstrution, waiting and then hoosing A after
any d
1
j
yields exatly the same payo as hoosing A in period 1. Hene, he
prefers waiting to hoosing A in period 1. On the other hand, waiting in
period 1 is at least as good as waiting and then hoosing B after any d
1
j
, and
the latter dominates hoosing B in period 1 by the above disussion. Hene,
waiting is optimal for type s
i
.
4. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
4
: This ase is similar to when (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
2
.
5. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
5
: This ase is similar to when (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
3
.
6. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
6
: minfq
A
; q
B
g > 1.
Every type waits sine
x = 0 and y = 1:
The equilibriumprie pair in period 2 then equals
 
p
2
A
(;; ;); p
2
B
(;; ;)

= (1  k; 1  k).
It follows that waiting is optimal sine it yields
max fE [v
i
j s
i
℄  (1  k); E [w
i
j s
i
℄  (1  k)g ;
whereas hoosing A or B in period 1 yields at most
max fE [v
i
j s
i
℄  (1  k)q
A
; E [v
i
j s
i
℄  (1  k)q
B
g :
7. (q
A
; q
B
) 2 R
7
: max fq
A
; q
B
g <
3 2k
6(1 k)
.
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No type waits sine
x = y =
1  q
A
+ q
B
2
:
By onstrution, the onditional belief P
i
( j h) of s
i
given h 2 H
i
is the uniform
distribution over [0; 1℄. Hene, any buyer who waits will fae the prie pair (1  
k; 1   k) in period 2.
Consider any type s
i
< x. He prefers A to B if fored to hoose between them in
period 1. If he waits and hooses A after any d
1
j
, then his payo from waiting is
dominated beause he faes a higher prie of A in period 2. If he waits and then
hooses A after d
1
j
= A and B after d
1
j
= B, then his payo is given by
xE

v
i
j s
i
; p
1
; d
1
j
= A

+ (1  x)E

w
i
j s
i
; p
1
; d
1
j
= B

  (1  k)
x
n
u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
  k
x
2
o
+ (1  x)

u+ (1  k)s
i
+ k
1 + x
2

  (1  k)
= u+ x  (1  k) + (1  k)s
i
(1  2x) +
k
2
(1  2x
2
):
On the other hand, hoosing A in period 1 yields
E [v
i
j s
i
℄  (1  k)q
A
= u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
 
k
2
  (1  k)q
A
:
Choosing A in period 1 is hene optimal if
u+ x  (1  k) + (1  k)s
i
(1  2x) +
k
2
(1  2x
2
)
 u+ 1  (1  k)s
i
 
k
2
  (1  k)q
A
;
or equivalently,
(1  k)q
A
 2  x  k   2(1   x)(1  k)s
i
  k(1  x
2
):
Sine s
i
< x and q
A
<
3 2k
6(1 k)
, this is in turn implied by
3  2k
6
 2(1   k)  (3  2k)x+ (2  k)x
2
= (2  k)

x 
3  2k
2(2  k)

2
+ 2(1  k) 
(3  2k)
2
4(2   k)
:
We an verify that this inequality holds sine k <
1
2
and
3  2k
6
 2(1  k) 
(3  2k)
2
4(2  k)
, (1  2k)(9   4k)  0:
The symmetri argument proves that hoosing B in period 1 is optimal when
s
i
> y.
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Step 2. We now examine the optimality of the prie q in (26).
Sine
3 2k
6(1 k)
< q < 1, the prie pair (q; q) belongs to the interior of region 1 in Figure
6. Hene, for any (q
A
; q
B
) in the neighborhood of (q; q), any history h = (p
1
; d
1
) is
followed by an interior equilibrium of Lemma 2. It follows that the equilibrium prie
must satisfy the rst-order ondition

^

A
q
A
(q
A
; q
B
) = 0. Partially dierentiating
^

A
with
respet to q
A
, we obtain

^

A
q
A
(q
A
; q
B
) = (1  k)

1
2
 
2q
A
  q
B
2

+
k
2
18(1   k)
"
 
1
2

1
2
+
2q
A
  q
B
2

1 
q
A
+ q
B
2

+

1
2
+
2q
B
  q
A
2

1 
q
A
+ q
B
2

 
1
2

1
2
+
2q
B
  q
A
2

1
2
+
2q
A
  q
B
2

#
:
(29)
If (q; q) is the symmetri period 1 prie prole in equilibrium, then

^

A
q
A
(q; q) = 0 must
hold. Substitution of q
A
= q
B
= q into (29) yields upon simpliation
1
2
(1  k) +
k
2
144(1   k)
 
1  k
2
q +
k
2
72(1   k)

 q  
3
2
q
2

= 0; (30)
or equivalently,
3k
2
q
2
+ 2

36(1   k)
2
+ k
2
	
q  

72(1   k)
2
+ k
2
	
= 0:
The non-negative solution to this quadrati equation is given by (26).
We now show that any q 2 (0; 1) satisfying (30) is a global maximizer:
^

A
(q; q) >
^

A
(q
A
; q) for any q
A
6= q.
a) (q
A
; q) 2 R
1
: 2q
A
  q  1 and 2q   q
A
 1.
The seond-order derivative of
^
(q
A
; q
B
) with respet to q
A
is given by

2
^

A
q
2
A
(q
A
; q
B
) =  1 +
k
2
72(1   k)
2
( 5  3q
B
+ 6q
A
) ;
whih is < 0 when q
A

q
B
+1
2
. It follows that

^

A
q
A
(q
A
; q
B
) is stritly dereasing
for any suh q
A
. This in turn implies that q
A
= q maximizes
^

A
(q
A
; q) over q
A
2
h
2q   1;
q+1
2
i
.
39
b) (q
A
; q) 2 R
2
:
k
4 3k
 q
A
 2q   1.
Sine y = 1, we have either d
1
j
= A or ;, and both d
1
= (;; A) and (;; ;) are followed
by an interior equilibrium in period 2. Sine
p
1
A
= xp
2
A
(;; A) + (1  x)p
2
A
(;; ;)
= x
1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)
3
+ (1  x)
1  k(x+ 1) + 2(1  k)(1   2x)
3
= (1  k)
3  4x
3
;
we have
q
A
=
3  4x
3
;
and q
A
2
h
k
4 3k
; 2q   1
i
, x 2
h
3(1 k)
4 3k
i
.
^

A
an be expressed in terms of x as:
^

A
(q
A
; q
B
)
= (1  k)q
A
x+ (1  x)

x
2
A
(;; A) + (1  x)
2
A
(;; ;)
	
= (1  k)
3  4x
3
x
+
1
18(1   k)
h
f1 + 2 (1  k) (1  2x)g f1  2k + 2(1   k)(1  2x)g
+ k
2
+ k
2
x(1  x)
i
We an verify that

^

A
x
< 0 for x 2 so that

^

A
q
A
> 0 for q
A
2. It is hene maximized
over this region when q
A
= 2q   1. Sine
^

A
is ontinuous at q
A
= 2q   1, we have
^

A
(2q   1; q) <
^

A
(q; q) from ase 1 above.
) (q
A
; q) 2 R
3
: q
A
<
k
4 3k
.
Sine y = 1 again, we have either d
1
j
= A or ;. d
1
= (;; A) is followed by an interior
equilibrium in period 2, while d
1
= (;; ;) is followed a B-orner equilibrium in period
2. Sine
p
1
A
= x p
2
A
(;; A) + (1  x) p
2
A
(;; ;)
= x
1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)
3
+ (1  x) 0
= x
1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)
3
;
we have
q
A
= x
1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)
3(1   k)
;
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and q
A
2
h
0;
k
4 3k

, x 2
h
3(1 k)
4 3k
;
3 2k
4 3k
i
.
^

A
an be expressed in terms of x as
^

A
(q
A
; q
B
) = (1  k)q
A
x+ (1  x)x
2
A
(;; A)
=
x
2
3
f1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)g
+
x
18(1   k)
f1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)g
2
=
x
18(1   k)
f1  kx+ 2(1  k)(1   2x)g
 f1  kx+ 2(1   k)(1 + x)g :
After some algebra, we see that

2
^

A
x
2
=
3x fk + (1  k)(9k   8)g   6 + 4k
9(1  k)
< 0;
and

^

A
x



x=
3(1 k)
4 3k
< 0:
These inequalities together imply that

^

A
x
< 0 over x 2

3(1 k)
4 3k
;
3 2k
4 3k

, and hene
that
^

A
is maximized when x =
3(1 k)
4 3k
. Equivalently,
^

A
(q
A
; q) is maximized when
q
A
=
k
4 3k
over q
A
2
h
0;
k
4 3k
i
. Sine
^

A
(q
A
; q) is ontinuous at q
A
=
k
4 3k
, we
onlude that
^

A
(
k
4 3k
; q) <
^

A
(q; q) from the above two ases.
d) (q
A
; q) 2 R
4
: q
A

q+1
2
.
Sine x = 0, we have either d
1
j
= B or ;, and both d
1
= (;; B) and (;; ;) are followed
by an interior equilibrium in period 2. Firm A's payo over two periods then equals:
^

A
(q
A
; q
B
)
= y

y
2
A
(;; ;) + (1  y)
2
A
(;; B)
	
=
1
18(1   k)
h
yf1  ky + 2(1  k)yg
2
+ (1  y)f1   k(1 + y) + 2(1  k)yg
2
i
:
By Lemma 4, we have
p
1
B
= yp
2
B
(;; ;) + (1  y)p
2
B
(;; B)
= y
 1 + ky + 2(1  k)(2y   1)
3
+ (1  y)
 1 + k(1 + y) + 2(1   k)(2y   1)
3
=
 1 + k + 2(1   k)(2y   1)
3
;
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or equivalently, y =
3(q
B
+1)
4
. Hene y is independent of q
A
, and so is
^

A
. It follows
that
^

A
(q
A
; q) =
^

A
(
q+1
2
; q). Sine
^

A
(; q) is ontinuous at q
A
=
q+1
2
, the analysis
in the rst ase implies that
^

A
(q; q) >
^

A
(q
A
; q) for any a
A

q+1
2
.
This ompletes the proof. 
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